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BYRON AND THE POST-SECULAR: 
QUIA IMPOSSIBILE 
 
 
Towards the beginning of Canto XVI of Don Juan, Byron’s narrator—who a few stanzas 
earlier referred to himself as ‘a temperate theologian’ (XV, 92)—quotes from De Carne 
Christi, a polemical riposte to the heretical doceticism of Marcion of Sinope, by the 
second-century theologian Tertullian, though he mistakenly attributes the saying to 
Augustine: 
 
[…] Saint Augustine has the great priority, 
     Who bids all men believe the impossible, 
Because ’tis so. Who nibble, scribble, quibble, he 
Quiets at once with ‘quia impossibile’. 
   
And therefore, mortals, cavil not at all; 
     Believe:—if ’tis improbable you must, 
And if it is impossible, you shall: 
     ’Tis always best to take things upon trust. 
I do not speak profanely, to recall 
     Those holier mysteries which the wise and just 
Receive as gospel […]. (XVI, 5-6) 
 
In citing and appearing to endorse Tertullian’s paradoxical credo, as is often the case in 
Byron’s poem, it’s hard to tell where the narrator’s tongue is in relation to his cheek; for 
although his ‘I do not speak profanely’ appears to confirm a reputation for irreverence—
in suggesting that he expects his audience not to take the allusion seriously—and whilst 
the notoriously sceptical poet may be more inclined in the face of authority to ‘nibble, 
scribble [or] quibble’ than to ‘take things upon trust’, there are a couple of factors that 
should be weighed against these received impressions. Firstly, as G.K. Chesterton 
reminds us—whose own overtly religious work argues for an alliance of levity and 
reverence—‘funny is not the opposite of serious’; it is ‘the opposite of not funny and of 
nothing else’.1 Likewise for Byron, seriousness and humour tend not to exist in a ‘zero-
sum’ relationship; rather, what we typically find are shimmering admixtures or 
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interlacements of heterogeneous tonalities (the ‘serious laughter’ of which the poet 
speaks is but one example of these mingled tonalities).2 What’s more, as Bernard Beatty 
has observed, Byron’s jokes introduce ideas and make available vocabularies that are 
‘intended to affect the reader in more ways than a joke’.3 Secondly, Byron’s invocation of 
the ‘quia impossibile’ is buttressed immediately afterwards by a claim of his own about 
the need to venture in the cause of truth beyond secular reason: 
 
I merely mean to say what Johnson said, 
     That in the course of some six thousand years, 
All nations have believed that from the dead 
     A visitant at intervals appears; 
And what is strangest upon this strange head, 
     Is, that whatever bar the reason rears 
’Gainst such belief, there’s something stronger still 
In its behalf, let those deny who will. (XVI, 7) 
 
One of the interesting things about this stanza, which recalls the epigraph to Manfred 
(‘There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio, / Than are dreamt of in your 
philosophy’), is that it presents a carefully reasoned argument in favour of that which 
exceeds reason. In this way, by anticipating objections (‘let those deny who will’), by 
openly acknowledging the oddity of his claim (‘what is strangest upon this strange head’) 
and in citing the support of the exemplary rationalist Johnson, the speaker attempts to 
persuade us of his commonsensical view of the things and to make clear that this is not a 
momentary or impassioned fancy but rather a settled and accepted belief, which 
transcends but does not extinguish reason, since the latter registers its own surpassing. 
And it is in asserting, in a settled and reasoned manner, that there are certain things in 
‘heaven and earth’ that compel assent in spite of the interdictions of reason—beliefs, that 
is, which are paradoxically sanctioned by even as they carry us beyond reason—that 
Byron’s narrator is advocating a position that is in certain important respects consonant 
with Tertullian’s. 
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Principally, what the two claims have in common—and what Byron, it seems, 
wishes to elicit from the reader—is a paradoxical openness to the possibility of the 
impossible.4 To be sure, there are differences between the claims. Tertullian’s assertion is 
a claim about God that has its basis in Scripture, most obviously, as the immediate 
context reveals, Paul’s comments in 1 Corinthians 1 about the foolishness of the 
Crucifixion (though we also find a logic of ‘possible impossibility’ in the Gospels: when 
Mary, for example, asks the angel Gabriel how she is to conceive since she is a virgin, the 
angel explains that ‘with God nothing shall be impossible’; and when the disciples ask 
Jesus—who has just told them it is easier for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle 
than for a rich man to enter the kingdom of God—who can be saved, Christ responds: 
‘With men this is impossible; but with God all things are possible’5). This tendency to 
associate God with the paradoxical possibility of the impossible leads the fifteenth-
century German theologian Nicholas of Cusa to suggest: ‘since nothing is impossible for 
God, we should look for Him […] in those things which are impossible in this world’.6 
Byron’s claim, by contrast, which emerges in the midst of a work of fiction (though he 
insists it’s true), relates to ‘visitants’ from beyond the grave—a dramatization of which in 
the cantos that follow is the source of much comedy but also some profoundly unsettling 
effects, which carry us away from a purely materialist vision without unequivocally 
delivering us into a religious sphere. Which is a reasonable introductory summary of 
what I shall refer to as a ‘post-secular’ stance. I shall explain this further in the sections 
that follow, though in view of Byron’s semi-facetious invocation of the ‘quia impossibile’ 
it is worth noting that a common feature of the post-secular vision is a strategy of ‘ludic 
avowal’, which John McClure describes as a way of making ‘the reintroduction of the 
religious palatable to secular-minded readers’ whilst checking ‘the tendency of religious 
speculation to drift towards dogmatism and intolerance’. 7  It’s important to bear this 
possibility in mind, since Byron’s facetious treatment of religious subjects is often taken 
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to be a sign of impiety or an index of his supposed non-belief. Yet if McClure is correct, 
levity would appear to be a much more open and ‘ambidextrous’ modality, which may 
even turn out to be an ally of the religious. 
Scripture of course is not generally associated with levity. But there is an 
instructive ‘antiphonal’ exchange of laughter in the story of Abraham, Sarah and Isaac in 
the book of Genesis, which helps to illustrate the antithetical valencies of levity, and also 
serves to drive home a lesson about the paradoxical possibility of the impossible. The 
first laugh proceeds from Abraham, who ‘fell upon his face, and laughed, and said in his 
heart, Shall a child be born unto him that is an hundred years old? and shall Sarah, that is 
ninety years old, bear?’ (17: 17). This is closely followed by the laughter of Sarah herself, 
who was listening outside the tent: ‘Sarah laughed within herself, saying, After I am 
waxed old shall I have pleasure, my lord being old also?’ (18: 12). Such an occurrence, for 
Abraham and Sarah, appears to be impossible. But God responds to their incredulous 
laughter by asking ‘Is anything impossible for the Lord?’ (18:14). 8  It’s hard to say 
precisely who has the last laugh, as it is projected to continue throughout the ages (21:6), 
but it is emphatically associated with the divine; for Sarah does indeed give birth, and the 
child is named Isaac, according to God’s command, which is a transliteration of the 
Hebrew Yiṣḥāq, meaning ‘laugh’. Thus the book of Genesis brings together and prompts 
us to reflect upon two contrasting kinds of laughter: a human laughter of disbelief in the 
face of that which appears impossible, and a divine laughter at that disbelief, which 
marks the paradoxical advent of the impossible.9 Whilst Byron is well known for his 
scoffing, sceptical and debunking laughter, it is the poet’s countervailing openness to the 
paradoxical possibility of the impossible with which this article will be concerned. More 
precisely, I wish to suggest in what follows that the contemporary post-secular 
paradigm—which offers a model of radical hospitality, unconstrained by the parameters 
of exclusionary immanence—may help us to appreciate without eliding the complexities 
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of Byron’s ambivalent engagement with the religious, which in the opinion of the Jesuit 
David Leigh has somewhat unhelpfully divided commentators on the subject into ‘the 
party of pessimism’ and ‘the salvation critics’.10 
  
I 
DEMYSTIFICATION IN REVERSE  
 
In order to explain what is meant by the post-secular and why it is of relevance to the 
Romantics, it will be helpful to say something—however summarily—about the ‘secular’ 
to which it is ‘post’. One of the most comprehensive accounts of this has been provided 
by Charles Taylor in A Secular Age. Broadly speaking, what Taylor describes in this 
monumental 900 page work is the extremely complex and profound shift in the West 
from a life lived beneath the ‘scared canopy’,11 imbued with a providential aura of the 
holy, to a ‘disenchanted’ world of ‘exclusive humanism’ and instrumental reason.12 Two 
of the defining features of this historical development are, firstly, the shift from a pre-
modern ‘porous’ self, which was ‘always already entwined with its beyond’ and 
‘essentially open to an outside’—be it ‘blessing or curse, possession or grace’—to what 
Taylor describes as a ‘buffered’ self, which is ‘insulated and isolated in its interiority’;13 
and secondly, a process of ‘immanentization’ or a correlative shift from a world that is 
normatively conceived as open to transcendence—in that, for the majority of people, the 
material order is suffused with and mediates that which exceeds it—to a realm of 
unsundered and enclosed materialism, which Taylor refers to as the ‘immanent frame’.14 
(In the concluding section of this article I shall suggest that this distinction between a 
‘closed immanence’ and an openness to transcendence has an important but largely 
unacknowledged corollary in criticism of Byron.) 
The roots of this process of ‘disenchantment’ and the concomitant emergence of 
a ‘de-transcendentalized’ sphere—which is viciously satirized by Carlyle’s Teufelsdröckh 
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in Sartor Resartus—most prominently lie, on the one hand, in the Enlightenment venture 
of separateness, which, although it wasn’t opposed to religion as such, but rather 
particular conceptions of God and certain features of pre-modern Christianity (such as 
mystery, supernaturalism and sacerdotal practices), nonetheless understood itself as a 
‘release from self-incurred tutelage’ under the guidance of secular reason.15 On the other 
hand, however, the Enlightenment’s ‘empty[ing] of the haunted air’16 was itself made 
possible by prior and even more profound changes within the religious sphere, which led 
to the loss of a ‘sacramental’ worldview or what Peter Berger refers to as a demise of the 
supernatural.17 This was drastically accelerated by the Protestant Reformation, which in 
general reinforced the separation of nature and the supernatural, rejecting their 
integration in the sacramental ontology of the patristic Platonic-Christian vision. Yet the 
foundations of this sacramental worldview had already been undermined by the 
emergence in the late medieval period of ‘univocity’ and ‘nominalism’, which according 
to Hans Boersma, were ‘the two blades of a pair of scissors’ that severed ‘the 
participatory link between earthly sacrament […] and heavenly reality’. 18  So, what 
Taylor—after Max Weber—refers to as ‘disenchantment’ can be seen as part of a larger 
historical tendency characterized by the ‘descramentalizing’ of Western culture, a 
searingly sarcastic assessment of which is provided by Novalis in the fragment 
Christendom or Europe. 
Now whilst in general I want to hold onto the disenchantment thesis as a helpful, 
if very approximate, way of describing certain historical changes, there are a number of 
complications that need to be acknowledged. In the first place, it is important to note 
that there are several competing models of secularization, only some of which reflect the 
unilinear process of demystification and religious decline that is posited in Weber’s 
narrative. (The ‘God is Dead’ model put forward by Steve Bruce is a well-known 
example of this ‘one-way’ disenchantment. 19 ) Such unilinear conceptions of 
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secularization have, for instance, been contested by José Casanova, whose 
‘differentiation’ thesis argues that secularization doesn’t necessarily entail religious decline 
and may instead involve an emancipation of secular spaces and cultural authority from 
the control of religious institutions; 20  by Peter Berger, who—even in the 1960s—
observed that ‘secularization consciousness is not the absolute it presents itself as’;21 and 
more recently by Patrick Sherry, who—with particular reference to a Catholic 
perspective—has argued that ‘enchantment’ never entirely went away.22   
 Even so, that something resembling the general tendency towards 
‘disenchantment’ described by Weber took place in the West during the period of 
modernity seems hard to dispute. What is also hard to dispute, however, is the 
unforeseen revival of the religious at the end of the twentieth and beginning of the 
twenty-first century. One of the more surprising features of this peripeteia—which, 
alongside the resurgence of fundamentalism, encompasses a bewildering array of new 
religions, sects and alternative spiritualities—is the way in which postmodern religion 
isn’t simply reflected in, but also appears in reverse to be fostered by, the prevalence of 
‘enchanted’ visions in contemporary culture, which as Christopher Partridge has argued, 
vitally shape the ‘plausibility structures of Westerners’.23 (It is part of the argument of this 
article that we are witnessing—and should welcome—the parallel emergence of a critical 
approach in Romantic studies that renounces the immanentizing assumptions of 
exclusive secularism and is instead open to, even as it is prepared to question, the 
possibility of radical transcendence.24) 
A similar point has been made by John Caputo in relation to advances in 
electronic forms of communication and the parallel distention of virtual reality, which 
offers us analogues of such things as disembodied interconnectivity or communion-in-
absence, which inevitably affect our sense of what is possible, believable and real. 25 
Indeed, one might say that the advent of virtual reality has led to something of a revival 
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of allegorical practices, since if the industrial revolution disfigured what Wordsworth 
referred to as ‘the speaking face of earth and heaven’ (The Prelude, V, 11-12), the digital 
revolution has opened up a plethora of new ‘speaking’ spaces and made possible 
previously unthinkable experiences of transcendence, communion or being ‘outside’ 
oneself. This is not to say, I should immediately add, that such things are intrinsically 
religious; the point is, rather, that they may help us to imagine, articulate or try on 
theological conceptions of the world, which may of course be purely ‘aesthetic’ 
experiences that elicit no metaphysical reflections; yet they may equally prompt us to 
wonder whether these digitized infinities and ‘ecstatic’ experiences of quasi-
transcendence might have analogues outside cyberspace. In other words, I am 
suggesting, virtual reality has serendipitously opened up a new, if somewhat paradoxical, 
realm of ‘natural theology’. Thus, in all sorts of unexpected areas, we can see a 
perforation of the ‘closed immanence’ that according to Taylor characterized the ‘secular 
age’.26 This partial recovery of a pre-modern ‘porosity’ manifestly differs—in its whence, 
its whither, its mood and its tonality—from the model of transcendence it ostensibly 
inherits. Very briefly, what I mean by this is that the ‘post-secular’ sense of 
transcendence seems, paradoxically, to be founded on scepticism as much as if not more 
than it is on faith; its envisioning of the beyond tends to be characterized either by an 
anonymous ‘excess’ or an ‘ontological abundance’;27 its positings of transcendence are 
more often than not conducted in a ‘weakened’ subjunctive mood or expressed as an 
interrogative longing; and its affirmations of faith typically exhibit a tonal reserve, in 
adopting a ludic or ironic cast. In the words of the political theorist William Connolly, 
this sundering of the ‘closed immanence’ of exclusive secularism has led to the opening 
up of ‘fugitive spaces of enchantment lodged between theistic faith and secular 
abstinence’28—spaces of ‘creative suspension’29 that are fecund with the possibilities of 
both perspectives, and as such are hospitable to new ways of thinking. These ‘porous’ or 
 9 
‘enchanted’ spaces—which renounce a secular construal of reality without adopting an 
exclusively religious stance—are the hallmark of a post-secular outlook.  
It is, I think, possible to distinguish broadly between two forms of such 
‘enchanted’ openness, one of which is more conceptual, the other more affective. The 
first of these has been brought into view by the contemporary French philosopher and 
founder of the ‘speculative realism’ movement, Quentin Meillassoux, whose testimony is 
especially persuasive as it is a predicament he in no way wishes to promote. Speaking of 
the postmodern ‘de-absolutization of thought’, he writes: 
 
Far from abolishing the value of the absolute, the process that continues to be 
referred to today as ‘the end of absolutes’ grants the latter an unprecedented 
licence […]. The end of metaphysics, understood as the ‘de-absolutization of 
thought’, is thereby seen to consist in the rational legitimation of any and every 
variety of religious […] belief in the absolute, so long the latter invokes no 
authority beside itself. To put it in other words: by forbidding reason any claim to the 
absolute, the end of metaphysics has taken the form of an exacerbated return of the religious. 
[…]  
 
Once the absolute has become unthinkable, even atheism, which also targets 
God’s inexistence in the manner of an absolute, is reduced to a mere belief, and 
hence to a religion, albeit of the nihilist kind. Faith is pitched against faith, since 
what determines our fundamental choices cannot be rationally proved. In other 
words, the de-absolutization of thought boils down to the mobilization of a fideist 
argument […].30 
 
Whilst I agree with this as a broad description of a dominant tendency in contemporary 
culture, it is worth noting that Meillassoux seems to view this fideistic openness solely as 
something negative (since, as he correctly observes, it can be used to sanction the worst 
forms of violence) and is uninterested in the possibility—which Byron, by contrast, was 
prepared to countenance—that beliefs which carry us beyond the ‘bar’ of reason may 
nonetheless orient us towards ‘what is’, and that there may be truths at which we cannot 
arrive purely by means of syllogistic reasoning.  
 A more positive construal of this post-secular openness to that which draws us 
beyond the ‘bar’ of reason has been somewhat flamboyantly elaborated across a series of 
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works by John Caputo. What makes his reflections of particular interest in the present 
context, though, is their revival of interest in the paradoxical possibility of the 
impossible. 31  (Caputo’s theological ruminations on the impossible are based on the 
writings of Derrida—on justice, the messianic and deconstruction etc.—in which the 
possibility of the impossible is entertained as a corollary of the uncircumscribable 
openness of what is ‘to come’, which in guarding against closure and making room for 
the other sponsors a posture of unconditional hospitality, which Derrida relates to the 
cities of refuge in the Old Testament.32) In essence, Caputo views postmodernism as a 
counter-reaction to the rationalistic chastities of the Enlightenment project—which 
sought, in Kant’s ‘court’ of pure reason, to proscribe the parameters of the knowable and 
the possible—and the demystifying suspicions of Marx, Freud and Nietzsche, who more 
radically sought to wipe away the horizon of transcendence. In its scepticism towards 
such ‘grand narratives’—which purport to speak with finality and context-less objectivity 
about the nature of the knowable, the possible and the real—postmodernism is 
construed by Caputo as a turning of the tide that has opened the way for more 
adventurous and subjunctivized exercises of rationality, and in doing so has encouraged 
an openness towards the possibility of the impossible. Yet, in contrast to Meillassoux, 
Caputo views this ‘subjunctivization’ of thought and the fideistic opening it encourages 
as a theological opportunity.  
 The second form of post-secular openness that I want to consider is less 
concerned with meaning or representation and more concerned with the realm of affect 
or what William Connolly refers to as ‘thought-imbued intensities’ subsisting below the 
threshold of conceptual refinement. 33  Such affects, according to Connolly, open up 
alternative spaces of possibility that are between, anterior to or ‘other than’ the categories 
of theistic faith and secular reason, which may help to foster an ethos of ‘deep pluralism’ 
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and a post-secular micropolitics of forbearance and generosity. Political strategies that 
take cognizance of such spaces are important, he writes, because: 
 
they work on thought-imbued intensities behind conscious thoughts not readily 
or fully subject to conscious purview; they are important to thinking and theory 
because such work on oneself can sometimes untie knots in one’s thinking; they 
are important to politics because such work can pave the way for new movement 
in the politics of becoming; and they are pertinent to the ethos of a pluralist 
culture because such work can help to install generosity and forbearance into 
ethical sensibilities in a world of multidimensional plurality.34 
 
The point of importance to take from this is that affects are (not uncontroversially) 
supposed to liberate a space that is distended with potentiality and a pluralized openness 
within the smudged becoming of subjectivity, prior to the refinements of conscious 
perception. And whilst they are only fugitive moments on the way to awareness, these 
fecund interstices in conscious experience permit a different, less conceptualized 
encounter with things, which is radically hospitable to a diversity of possibilities.  
Let us take stock of what we have covered so far. In seeking to explain what is 
meant by the post-secular, I have adopted two divergent approaches—one of which is 
more historical, the other more philosophical or conceptual—and in doing so I have 
attempted to accomplish two general things. On the one hand, by situating the advent of 
a post-secular outlook within a larger historical narrative that charts what many assumed 
to be the unilinear disenchantment of modernity, I have suggested that the emergence of 
a post-secular perspective may be seen as a form of what Mircea Eliade has referred to as 
‘demystification in reverse’35 or a diffident, subjunctivized form of re-enchantment. On 
the other hand, in the foregoing excursus on post-secular philosophy, I have attempted 
to highlight what I take to be the most salient feature of a post-secular stance—namely, a 
radical ontological hospitality, two forms of which I have illustrated here. The first, more 
discursive form of such hospitality, which is born of the ‘porous’ scepticism of 
postmodernity, has led to a dilation of the parameters of the possible, such that the 
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impossible has paradoxically been reinstated within the realms of possibility; the second, 
more affective form of hospitality, associated with the domain of ‘unowned’ 
impingements or intensities anterior to conceptual refinement, has been identified as an 
alternative space of ‘enchantment’, lodged between theistic and secular commitments, 
which offers us ways of nurturing ‘new possibilities of thinking and being’. In the next 
section, I want to consider why this is of relevance to the Romantics and Byron in 
particular. 
 
II 
PROPHETS OF THE POST-SECULAR 
 
In parallel with the approach of the preceding section, there are two ways considering the 
relevance of a post-secular perspective to the Romantics. On the one hand, it is possible 
to trace an historical connection, by locating Romanticism within a larger counter-
Enlightenment tradition that stretches back to the German philosopher Johann Georg 
Hamann, and which is antagonistically sustained during the period of modernity by a 
variety of thinkers—such as Nietzsche, Kierkegaard and Heidegger—but which reaches 
its apogee in postmodernity. (Versions of this thesis have been espoused by Jonathan 
Israel in Radical Enlightenment and Graham Garrard in Counter-Enlightenments from the 
Eighteenth Century to the Present. In line with such philosophical thinkers, the literary critic 
John McClure has claimed that post-secularism ‘has been a feature of literary thinking 
since the romantics’.36) On the other hand, in more conceptual terms, we might point 
towards convergences between prominent Romantic preferences and salient features of a 
post-secular stance. And in highlighting the ontological openness of the post-secular 
outlook, along with its privileging of the realm of affect, we have already started to do 
the latter. In view of the limitations of space I shall try, in a necessarily abbreviated 
fashion, to illustrate something of these convergences with reference to Byron. To do so, 
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I shall focus on two moments of sustained and distended receptivity to the divine, one in 
Don Juan and the other in Childe Harold; the first of which evinces a more reflective 
openness, whilst the second dramatizes a more affectively-toned response to the divine. 
In both cases, though, what we can see is a hospitality to that which exceeds secular 
rationality—or what, from its perspective, may be deemed ‘the impossible’—which 
obviously doesn’t go unquestioned in his poetry and is typically accompanied by a 
countervailing attention to the materiality of our predicament. However, the poet’s 
openness to even such contested intimations of transcendence is sufficient to sunder the 
‘closed immanence’ of an exclusively secular vision. The section of Don Juan on which I 
wish to focus is the description of Norman Abbey in Canto XIII. Here is part of the first 
‘movement’. The ‘grand arch’ of ‘the Gothic pile’: 
 
[…] frown’d superbly o’er the soil, 
     And kindled feelings in the roughest heart,   470 
Which mourn’d the power of time’s or tempest’s march, 
In gazing on that venerable arch. 
  
[…] 
    
But in a higher niche, alone, but crowned, 
     The Virgin Mother of the God-born Child, 
With her Son in her blessed arms, look’d round, 
     Spared by some chance when all beside was spoil’d; 
She made the earth below seem holy ground. 
     This may be superstition, weak or wild, 
But even the faintest relics of a shrine 
Of any worship wake some thoughts divine. (59-61)  
 
At the centre of these stanzas is a fugitive and faltering sense of enchantment or 
mysterious ‘excess’ that at once points towards a particular historical situation and 
anticipates the subsequent events of the poem. This sense of ‘enchantment’, which 
simultaneously eludes and allures the narrator, is registered in a number of ways, many of 
which may seem innocuous in themselves and little more than the curvature of poetic 
fancy. Taken together, though, these lightly entertained suggestions of excessive or 
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sojourning presences dilate the parameters of an ostensibly secular construction of 
reality. Intimations of this kind of excess—of something that exceeds the material—are 
apparent, for example, in lines 469-71; for whilst the faintly anthropomorphic ‘frowned’, 
at least when considered in isolation, appears to carry little ontological significance, it 
does, subtly, in a conventionalized manner, introduce a sense of ‘excessive’ life, which 
both reinforces and is reinforced by its ability to ‘kindle feelings’ in the heart of the 
beholder. To be sure, there is nothing supernatural about this sort of affectivity; yet it 
does, lightly, open up a sense of adventitious reciprocity—in spite of an ontological 
asymmetry—which contributes to a more pervasive impression that the place is open to 
something beyond it. This tentatively entertained sense of excessive presence is apparent 
in the next stanza too, where the narrator describes the ‘twelve saints […] sanctified in 
stone’, whose location elevates the beholder’s gaze (from the arch to a niche ‘nigh to its 
pinnacle’). The sculpted saints are of course no longer there; but what we might refer to 
as their affectivity in absentia—that is, their persistence in the narrator’s historical 
memory in spite of their absence—corresponds to another kind of ‘liturgical’ paradox 
that the narrator’s description brings into view. Specifically, the faint sense of unsettled 
insentience that is evoked by the poet’s description of the saints—who once ‘stood’ 
within a niche—corresponds to what is, from the perspective of a believer, a genuine 
ontological indeterminacy; for although such statues are manifestly inanimate, they are 
supposed to call to mind and thus in some sense ‘make present’ a real communion with 
the figures they depict, which transgresses the boundary between the worldly and the 
other-worldly. In their affects, therefore, the statues may be said to exceed their 
inanimacy. Indeed, they legitimately induce a sort of counter-rational comportment in the 
worshipper, who is encouraged to address deceased and absent figures as though they 
were alive and present.  
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 These intimations of ‘excessive’ presence are further intensified in the following 
stanza, which elevates the gaze of the beholder still higher and focuses on the ‘Virgin 
Mother of the God-born child’, to whom the Priory of Newstead was dedicated. Once 
again—in omitting to mention he is speaking about a statue and in using a verb-form 
implying activity—whilst preserving a tone of factual observation, the poet’s description 
discreetly fosters the impression of a living human figure. And as in stanza 59, this sense 
of mediated or ‘excessive’ presence is reinforced by an accompanying impression of the 
statue’s affectivity or what Ronald Finucane in another context calls ‘holy radioactivity’37: 
‘She made the earth below seem holy ground’. (There is a lovely ambiguity in ‘the earth 
below’, which in view of the Virgin’s ‘extra-terrestrial’ perspective and protective role 
permits a widening from the ground immediately beneath the statue to include the whole 
earth.)  
Naturally, after the expression of such reverence (which recalls the Ave Maria 
stanzas of Canto III), the poet is assailed by a sense of embarrassment and the counter-
promptings of sceptical reason (‘This may be superstition weak or wild’). Yet he does not 
revoke his intimations of a sacralizing presence; neither does he disavow his sense of the 
Abbey as an ‘enchanted’ place; and nor does he retract the suggestion that its icon of the 
Virgin Mother and child may serve a ‘sacramental’ purpose that subverts the boundary 
between the terrestrial realm and the ‘worlds beyond [its] perplexing waste’ (DJ, XVI, 
48). Indeed, to the contrary, in the face of his own reflexive scepticism, he re-affirms his 
view about the adventitious affectivity of hallowed places: ‘even the faintest relic of a 
shrine—/ Of any worship—wakes some thoughts divine’. But this is not all.  
 The poet’s description of Norman Abbey has a second symmetrical movement, 
which recapitulates the stages of the foregoing sequence, but modulates into a different 
key, with a dramatic slowing of the discourse time and a tilting away from summary 
‘telling’ towards a ‘showing’ staged in front of the reader.  
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A mighty window, hollow in the centre, 
     Shorn of its glass of thousand colourings, 
Through which the deepen’d glories once could enter, 
     Streaming from off the sun like seraph’s wings, 
Now yawns all desolate: now loud, now fainter, 
     The gale sweeps through its fretwork, and oft sings 
The owl his anthem, where the silenced quire 
Lie with their hallelujahs quench’d like fire. 
 
But in the noontide of the moon, and when 
     The wind is wingéd from one point of heaven, 
There moans a strange unearthly sound, which then 
     Is musical—a dying accent driven 
Through the huge arch, which soars and sinks again. (62-3) 
 
As in the earlier stanzas where the arch ‘frowned’ and the saints once ‘stood’, here the 
mighty window ‘yawns’ and ‘the silenced choir / Lie with their halleluiahs quenched like 
fire’. Once again, we have a strangely spectral sense of persistence, for although the choir 
is emphatically ‘silenced’, the choice of ‘Lie’—like the earlier ‘stood’—entails an eerie 
ontological indeterminacy in its unsettling of the distinction between presence and 
absence. And once again this tentatively ventured sense of excessive presence gives way 
to a bolder suggestion of other-worldly involvement, introduced by the charged initial 
‘But’. In this case, the intimation of a foreign iridescence—the ‘strange unearthly’ yet 
‘musical’ sound—is rendered even more uncanny by the existential ‘there’ construction, 
which in giving us a verb ahead of its subject eerily dissociates the sound from its 
moaning. Though as with the icon of the Blessed Virgin, the arch—which is physically 
open to the wind—is presented as a sort of ‘sacramental’ aperture, which testifies to the 
openness of the diurnal realm to that which is beyond it. And finally, as in the foregoing 
sequence, the poet seems somewhat embarrassed by his own receptivity to other-worldly 
intimations, at which he smilingly invites us to smile, but not before re-affirming their 
basis in fact: ‘The cause I know not, nor can solve, but such / The fact; I’ve heard it—
once perhaps too much.’ 
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Earlier, I suggested that these fugitive intimations of enchantment point 
‘outwards’ to a particular historical situation but also point ‘inwards’ in forecasting the 
poem’s climactic events. I shall address the latter first, as it can be indicated more 
summarily.  
There is an important but subtle analogy between the narrator’s initial description 
of the Abbey—which begins in an urbane and jaunty manner (‘To Norman Abbey 
whirled the noble pair’) but unexpectedly modulates into a minor key and something 
more akin to a graveyard meditation—and the appearance of the ghost of the Black Friar 
that follows. More precisely, the narrator is haunted by the in-breaking of an other-
worldly presence—which is at once disturbing and a source of humour—in a way that 
anticipates and proleptically corroborates the haunting of the characters by the Abbey’s 
principal ghost (which is the most conspicuous example of the poem’s hospitality to ‘the 
impossible’). There is also, I think, a suggestive connection with the events that follow in 
the description of the Abbey’s ‘unearthly’ music as ‘sad, but serene’ (XIII, 64), which 
parallels the subsequent description of Aurora as ‘radiant and grave’ (XV, 45). What’s 
more, this linguistic parallel points us towards another connection, as there is a sense in 
which Aurora is the mirror-image of the Abbey’s other spectral presence—namely, the 
ghost of the Black Friar—both of whom quite precisely have their being ‘between two 
worlds’ (DJ, XV, 99), although their ontological ‘ec-centricity’ carries them in opposite 
directions. What I mean by this is that if the ‘worlds beyond’ have more of Aurora’s 
existence, on account of her ‘self-transcending’ spirituality (XVI, 48), it might be said 
conversely of the ghost that due to its ‘excessive’ materiality, the terrestrial world has more 
of its existence. In short, what I think these correspondences bring to light is a tentative 
but coherent pattern of criss-crossings between the terrestrial and the other-worldly. Let 
us turn now to the historical dimension. 
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 Byron’s elegiac description of the ruined and desecrated Abbey, which—as he 
reminds us—once was ‘Rome’s’, clearly foregrounds the ‘godly vandalism’ of the 
Reformation38 (though it also refers to the damages incurred in the Civil War). Perhaps 
the most pointed allusion to the former is to be found in stanza 62, in which the ‘mighty 
window’ is said to be ‘Shorn of its glass of thousand colourings’. ‘Shorn’ is an extremely 
odd verb to use; however, its oddity is precisely evocative, as it expresses the very 
deliberate—indeed, fastidious—violence of the iconoclasts; and whilst on the one hand it 
registers a sense of something immoderate in need of cutting back, on the other hand in 
the unnaturalness of its use in this context it evokes something of the horror that the 
iconoclasts’ systematic destruction occasioned. But there is another, less obvious 
reminder that the worldly events of the English Cantos take place in the shadow of the 
Long Reformation—and that, I suggest, is the narrator’s receptivity to the Abbey’s 
residual aura of ‘enchantment’.  
 There are several somewhat surprising reasons why this aura of enchantment 
survived, albeit in an attenuated way, the Reformers’ ‘assault on the immanence of the 
holy’ and their programmatic attempt to ‘evacuate the divine from the material 
universe’.39 As Alexandra Walsham has argued, in her excellent study of the impression 
the Reformation left on the natural environment in Britain and Ireland, the late medieval 
‘economy of the sacred’, with its sacramental worldview and its ‘territories of grace’, was 
not as entirely eradicated by the Reformation as many historians have hitherto thought.40 
This is firstly because, in certain cases, the iconoclasts’ desecration of hallowed places 
had the paradoxical side-effect of simultaneously re-sanctifying them and ‘reproducing 
the awe they [were] designed to dispel’.41 As Walsham explains, both Protestants and 
Catholics were unwittingly affected by this paradoxical process of re-sanctification:  
 
If defaced monasteries, shrines, chapels, wells and other topographical landmarks 
had the potential to become places of near veneration by the hotter sort of 
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Protestants, they also served to stir up intense feelings of regret and 
embarrassment in those who saw them as testimonies to puritan excess and 
sectarian sacrilege. In turn these emotions fostered an impulse to reconsecrate 
spaces polluted by profane use.42 
 
Secondly, a sense of enchantment survived because it was not uncommon for the 
desecration of hallowed sites to engender an unintended displacement of devotion onto 
‘revered spots in the natural landscape’.43 Thus, to summarize a complex argument, the 
Protestant programme of desacralization involved an unforeseen counter-tendency to 
evoke, even as it sought to extinguish, an aura of enchantment.  
 What is brought into view by the recent historical studies of Alexandra Walsham, 
Robert Scribner and others is a much more complex and much less linear narrative of 
‘disenchantment’ than the one popularized by Max Weber; and it is to this more complex 
and ambivalent picture of the post-Reformation ‘twilight zone’44 that I propose Byron’s 
stanzas on Norman Abbey point. In particular, whilst the poet’s sceptical and ironic 
gestures (‘This may be superstition weak or wild’; ‘I’ve heard it—once perhaps too 
much’) are indications of an Enlightenment mentality, his fugitive and faltering 
intimations of transcendence elicited by the desecrated Abbey point towards a 
persistence of enchantment—albeit in weakened, nostalgic or displaced ways—even 
amongst Protestants (or what Michael O’Neill has wittily referred to as ‘Cathostants’ and 
‘Protolics’). Something of the way in which the Reformers’ programme of desacralization 
paradoxically engendered even as it sought to eradicate a sense of holiness is, for 
example, apparent in the poet’s response to ruined or now absent features of the Abbey 
(the saints, the window, the choir etc.), whose destruction elicits a sense of enchantment 
in an elegiac key. Similarly, we can see something of the unintended tendency for 
devotion to be displaced onto the natural landscape, in response to the desecration of 
architectural structures, in the migrations of holiness between the Abbey and the natural 
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environment described by the poet in stanzas 62-3, in which the choir’s now silenced 
song appears to be taken up by nature.  
 What I have sought to bring out in this brief reading, drawing on revised 
historical accounts of post-Reformation desacralization, is firstly that we can see 
something akin to what Scribner describes as a ‘twilight zone’ in Byron’s envisioning of 
Norman Abbey, which interweaves scepticism and glimmers of levity with an elegiacally 
inflected sense of enchantment; and secondly that this manifestly ‘fragilized’ sense of 
enchantment—which the poet cannot sustain or unequivocally endorse—nonetheless 
involves an openness to the possibility of transcendence. It is this ambivalent but 
unforeclosed posture towards the religious that signals the opening up of a post-secular 
perspective avant la lettre, which has come to fruition in the postmodern period. Let us 
turn now to our second example.  
 According to William Connolly, the generative spaces of pre-conceptual 
becoming associated with the realm of affect may also constitute an opening in an 
otherwise seamlessly secular vision. Of course, there is a long and rich tradition—with its 
epicenter in the monastic milieu of the medieval period—in which affectivity is 
privileged as a religious modality (as seen, for example, in the writings of Denys the 
Areopagite, William of St-Thierry, Bonaventure, Bernard of Clairvaux and, more 
recently, Schleiermacher). Nevertheless, Connolly’s association of affect with the post-
secular is a timely reminder of this traditional connection—especially given the curious 
neglect of religious concerns in the recent ‘turn to affect’. This neglect is all the more 
remarkable in Romantic studies, in view of the intimate interlacement of religion and 
feeling in so many of its authors. In what sense, then, does affect constitute a religious 
opening or space of enchantment in Byron’s poetry? 
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 An obvious place to look for answers to this question is Canto III of Childe 
Harold (in which there is a significant increase in the use of the words ‘feel’ and ‘feeling’ 
relative to the preceding cantos). Here is one of the most fascinating examples: 
 
Then stirs the feeling infinite, so felt     
In solitude, where we are LEAST alone;     
A truth, which through our being then doth melt,     
And purifies from self:  it is a tone,     
The soul and source of music, which makes known     
Eternal harmony […]. (94) 
 
Byron is of course frequently criticized for his use of opaque and contorted 
constructions, which appear in places to mar his sense. Yet it seems to me that part of 
the accomplishment of this particular stanza comes from its very lack of clarity and the 
puzzling questions it elicits from us. This lack of clarity most prominently proceeds from 
the ambiguity of the key phrase ‘the feeling infinite’, which could either be a head noun 
followed by a postpositive modifier or a participial adjective followed by a head noun; 
but it is also encouraged by the curious absence of specified subjectivity in the first 
line—which employs another of the poet’s eerie ‘existential’ constructions, which seem 
to serve as signals of the other-worldly45—and by the subsequent referential shuffling, 
across different modalities, in which ‘the feeling infinite’ (whatever that means) is 
appositionally identified first with a ‘truth’, which seems to imply some sort of 
conceptual component, and then with an a-sematic ‘tone’, which is glossed as the ‘soul 
and source of music’. The kinds of questions this lack of clarity prompts are: Is it a 
feeling extended to infinity or an infinity endowed with feeling? Is it something that takes 
place within the subject or does it exist as an exterior phenomenon? Whilst the former, 
more ‘sensual’ and less religious alternatives might seem more plausible, the latter 
possibilities—which in positing a sentient infinity (or an infinity capable of actively 
‘feeling’ in the sense of reaching out to or seeking to touch us) are clearly closer to a 
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religious affirmation—are underwritten by the preceding stanza, which adumbrates an 
explicitly religious vision in which all things participate in the being of their Creator, who 
is envisaged as a sort of sentient infinity.  
 In the view of some critics, such as Philip Martin, this kind of ambiguity is a fault 
and a sign of the ‘rather confused relationship between the poet and nature that Childe 
Harold III proposes’.46 Yet this seems to me to miss the point; for what we have here, I 
suggest, isn’t confused poetry, it is an accurate description of a confused experience. For 
the German philosopher and theologian Schleiermacher, who was Byron’s 
contemporary—and whose philosophical writings are unencumbered by the demands of 
verse—it is the nature of this ‘feeling infinite’ to precede and thus in a sense ‘confuse’ the 
conceptual distinctions between ‘subject’ and ‘object’, ‘interior’ and ‘exterior’. In 
Schleiermacher’s words, it is a ‘mysterious moment’ in which ‘sense and its objects have, 
as it were, flowed into one another and become one’.47 This doesn’t of course mean that 
it is in fact so. But it does suggest that Byron, rather than getting a rationally clear 
experience confused, may have been very precisely evoking an experience that was 
constituted by such a confusion. The second thing to notice about Byron’s ambiguous 
presentation of ‘the feeling infinite’ is that it is a post-secular ambiguity, in that it is open to 
and keeps simultaneously in play both secular and religious interpretations of the 
experience.  
 Clearly, these reflections on Byron’s conception of ‘infinite feeling’ barely scratch 
the surface of this under-examined and fascinating subject. Though they should suffice 
to illustrate the general contention of this section: namely, that affect, for Byron, may 
also perforate the ostensibly ‘closed immanence’ of the secular order. What’s more, it 
may do so in a number of ways: for example, as we have seen, it can ‘make known’ the 
eternal beyond; but it can also lure the subject ecstatically ‘outside’ itself, in a way that 
discloses its ‘immortal lot’ (CHP, III, 74); and it can in addition ‘dilate / Our spirits’ in a 
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manner that renders us open to that which exceeds us (CHP, IV, 158). Of course, the 
opening it creates is imperfect; but, as Jean-Yves Lacoste observes, ‘Affection is partial; 
and this is not by deficit: its powerlessness to feel everything actually honours the 
superabundance of what appears to it’.48  
 
* 
 
So what should we take away from all this? At the outset of this article, it was suggested 
that adopting a post-secular perspective may help us to appreciate without eliding the 
complexities of Byron’s ambivalent engagement with the religious. This is because the 
radical hospitality of the post-secular framework—which doesn’t affirm any belief a priori 
and doesn’t refuse any belief a priori,49 but instead invites us to ‘dwell in possibility’50—
helps to resist any partisan foreclosure of the alternatives on the basis of a species of 
historical condescension. This posture of unconditional openness, which is founded on a 
postmodern epistemological humility, might appear to be something to which all critical 
approaches aspire. But it is by no means so. Indeed, three of the most influential strands 
of Romantic criticism over the last few decades have been predicated upon dogmatic 
refusals and prior ideological commitments, which rule out certain possibilities in 
advance. Marjorie Levinson’s new historicist project, for example, is founded on an 
explicit and rather illiberal refusal of transcendence,51 the significance of which for her 
critical practice can hardly be overstated (for it is by assuming in advance the invalidity of 
the Romantics’ transcendent aspirations that she can discredit the manifest themes of 
their poetry and read them as a displacement of socio-political realities). Similarly, the 
work of Paul de Man, which for all its avowals about the endless openness of the act of 
reading, clearly evinces a dogmatic commitment to certain nihilistic conceptions of the 
real—to do with ‘the nothingness of human matters’52 and the abyss between the subject 
and language—which lead him to shut down alternative possibilities as ‘mystifications’ by 
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sheer assertion. Likewise, finally, Jerome McGann’s work on on ‘Romantic ideology’—
which he describes as a ‘project in radical unbelief’53—assumes on the basis of prior 
commitments about the nature of reality that Romantic aspirations to transcendence are 
an escapist fantasy or a form of ‘false consciousness’, and so explicitly seeks to close off 
identification with Romanticism’s ‘self-representations’. 54  This sort of secular 
fundamentalism—which takes for granted a framework of ‘closed immanence’ and 
refuses a priori the legitimacy of alternative perspectives—has been ‘normalized’ by years 
of institutional acceptance and so appears, to many, as a form of neutrality. And yet it is 
as dogmatically prejudicial as its religious counterparts and has, I suggest, resulted in a 
serious impoverishment of Romantic art. These kinds of prejudicial foreclosures are 
especially detrimental to a poet like Byron, who, as I have sought to show, doubts and 
smirks at but is also prepared to countenance the possible validity of Romantic 
intimations of transcendence. This possibility is, however, closed off in advance by 
readings of the poet that often unreflectively impose a framework of exclusionary 
immanence upon his works. (And there is a long tradition of critics in Byron studies—
including Brian Wilkie, Robert Gleckner, Jerome McGann, Charles LaChance and, most 
recently, Clara Tuite—who have sought to ‘immanentize’ the world of Byron’s poetry.55) 
Of course, Byron is incorrigibly sceptical and congenitally facetious about such 
intimations, which are interwoven amongst conflicting concerns and frailly preserved as 
nothing more than a possibility—perhaps even the paradoxical possibility of the 
impossible. And yet, as Nietzsche—that prophet of another epoch—reminds us, ‘even 
the thought of a possibility can shatter and transform us’.56 
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